Using ultra-high-frequency data extracted from the order flows of 23 stocks traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, we study the empirical regularities of order placement in the opening call auction, cool period and continuous auction. The distributions of relative logarithmic prices against reference prices in the three time periods are qualitatively the same with quantitative discrepancies. The order placement behavior is asymmetric between buyers and sellers and between the inside-the-book orders and outside-the-book orders. In addition, the conditional distributions of relative prices in the continuous auction are independent of the bid-ask spread and volatility. These findings are crucial to build an empirical behavioral microscopic model based on order flows for Chinese stocks.
Introduction
Stylized facts are common statistical characters observed from different stocks within different time periods and usually presented in a qualitative form. Concerning equity returns, the stylized facts contain the absence of autocorrelations, heavy tails, multifractality and intermittency, volatility clustering, leverage effect, and so on [1, 2, 3] . Many stylized facts in financial markets can be reproduced with microscopic models. If a microscopic model presents mock stylized facts in conformity with real ones, this model is believed to have catched some underlying regularities of financial markets. Based on how the price forms, there are two types of microscopic models for financial markets known as the agent-based models and order driven models [3] . The price variations in agent-based models are determined by the imbalance between demand and supply, including percolation models [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] , Ising models [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] , minority games [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23] , and others [24, 25] . The price in orderdriven models changes based on the continuous double auction (CDA) mechanism [26, 27, 28, 29] . Two fundamental ingredients of order-driven models are order placement and order cancelation [26] . The regularities governing the dynamical processes of order placement and cancelation can be determined empirically in some sense. In this way, very realistic behavioral models can be constructed.
Order placement plays a key role in the simulation of price formation in order driven models, since the proportion of placed orders is much greater than that of canceled orders. When placing an order, the trader need to determine its sign ("+1" for buys and "−1" for sells), size and price. In determining the order price, the trader faces a situation of dilemma and has to balance two contradictive factors, the certainty of execution on one hand and the potential benefit on the other hand. Patient traders possibly consider the fact of benefit more important than the other and place orders inside the limit-order book with a less aggressive price (high price for sellers and low for buyers). The situation is different for impatient traders who consider the factor of execution certainty in the first place. This kind traders want to make a transaction as soon as possible and place the order outside the limit-order book with a more aggressive price (low for sellers and high for buyers). In this work, we focus on the prices of submitted orders.
Zovko and Farmer studied the unconditional distribution of relative limit prices defined as the distance from the same best prices for orders placed inside the limitorder book [30] . They merged the data from 50 stocks traded on the London Stock Exchange (August 1, 1998 to April 31, 2000) and found that the distribution decays roughly as a power law with the tail exponent approximately α = 1.5 for both buy and sell orders. Bouchaud et al. analyzed the order books of three liquid stocks on the Paris Bourse (February 2001) and found that the relative price of new orders placed inside the book follows a power-law distribution with the tail exponent α = 0.6 [31] . Potters and Bouchaud investigated the relative limit price distributions for inside-the-book orders of three Nasdaq stocks (June 1 to July 15, 2002) and found that the distributions exhibit power-law tails with an exponent α = 1 [32] . Maskawa analyzed 13 rebuild order books of Stock Exchange Electronic Trading Service from July to December in 2004 on the London Stock Exchange and found that the limit prices for all orders inside the book are broadly distributed with a power-law tail whose exponent is α = 1.5 [33] , which is consistent with the results of Zovko and Farmer [30] . He also presented the distribution in the negative part for more aggressive order outside the book and found that the negative part decays much faster than the positive part. Mike and Farmer focused on the stock named AZN and tested on 24 other stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange [26] . They found that the distribution of relative logarithmic prices can be fitted by a Student distribution with α = 1.0 − 1.65 degrees of freedom and the distribution is independent of bid-ask spread at least over a restricted range for both buy and sell orders.
There are also efforts to seek for factors influencing order placement. Using 15 stocks on the Swiss Stock Exchange, Ranaldo found that both bid-ask spread and volatility negatively relate to order aggressiveness [34] . Lillo analyzed the origin of power-law distribution of limit order prices with the method of considering the order placement as an utility maximization problem considering three factors: time horizon, utility function and volatility [35] . He found that the heterogeneity in time horizon is the proximate cause of the power-law distribution, while heterogeneity in volatility is hardly connected with the origin of power-law distribution.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain the data set analyzed and briefly introduce the trading rules of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SSE). Section 3 presents the unconditional probability distributions of relative prices in three periods: opening call auction, cool period, and continuous double auction. We then study in Section 4 the conditional probability distributions against bid-ask spread and volatility, respectively. The last section concludes.
Dataset
We analyze a huge database containing the order flows of 23 liquid stocks listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in the whole year 2003 [36] . The order flow records ultra-high-frequency data whose time stamps are accurate to 0.01 second including details of every event. Each limit order can be identified by the order placement time. The logarithmic price of an order at time t is denoted as π(t). The tick size of the quotation price of an order is RMB 0.01 yuan. As an emerging stock market, with the purpose of speculation limitation and healthy development, the Exchange imposes a daily price limit of 10% on trading of stocks, which means that the maximum price fluctuation on trading day T must be restricted to ten percent of the closing price p(T − 1) of the previous trading day. More details about the trading rules can be found in Ref. [37] .
The Chinese stock market is an order-driven market with the key mechanism called continuous double auction (CDA). Before July 1, 2006, only limit orders are allowed. There are three time periods for open call auction (9:15 a.m. to 9:25 a.m.), cool period (9:25 a.m. to 9:30 a.m.), and continuous double auction (9:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. and 13:00 p.m. to 15:00 p.m.). Table 1 shows the numbers of valid buy and sell orders placed in the three periods.
Unconditional distributions of relative logarithmic prices
We define the relative price x as the logarithmic distance of order price from a reference price, which is presented as follows,
where π(t) is the logarithmic price of a coming order at time t, π r 1 (t − 1) and π r 2 (t − 1) are the logarithmic reference prices right before the order is placed at time t. Roughly speaking, orders with larger relative prices x are more aggressive.
In the Chinese stock market, there is a daily price limit of 10%. If the closure price of a stock on a trading day is p, then the price of any new order in the successive trading day is constrained in the range [p min , p max ] = [R(0.9p), R(1.1p)], where R(y) is the round number of y. The definition domain of the relative price x is
Therefore, all the distribution diagrams in this work have fixed abscissa width. In addition, no matter what the functional form of the distribution is, arbitrary moments of x exist.
In the ensuing subsections, we study the probability distributions of relative prices x for 23 stocks in the three periods (opening call auction, cool period and continuous auction) with different trading mechanisms. We have compared the distributions for individual stocks and found that they are remarkably analogous. This is not surprising since the same traders invest in different stocks which makes the order placement dynamics underlying different stocks behave similarly. We thus treat all the stocks as an ensemble and study the distribution aggregating all the 23stock data in each period. This treatment is also supported by the fact that x is dimensionless and varies within [−0.2007, 0.2007] for all stocks. 
Distributions in opening call auction
Opening call auction is held between 9:15 and 9:25 on each trading day. It refers to the process of one-time centralized matching of buy and sell orders accepted during this time period. At any time t, the virtual transaction price π v (t) is determined according to the following principles: (i) the price that generates the greatest trading volume; (ii) the price which allows all the buy orders with higher bid price and all the sell orders with lower offer price to be executed; (iii) the price which allows either buy side or sell side to have all the orders identical to such price to be executed. Orders are executed together at the end of opening call auction. The word "virtual" means that the orders are not really executed and the price is disposed to all traders. Whenever a new order arrives or an order is canceled 1 , the virtual price is updated. However, we focus on new prices only when new orders are submitted, which are stamped with time t. In other words, the time t increases by one step after a new valid order is placed.
According to the definition of relative price x in Eq. (1), in the opening call auction we have
is the virtual transaction price at time t − 1. Fig. 1 presents the probability distribution of relative prices x for buy orders (circles) and sell orders (diamonds) in the opening call auction. Fig. 1(a) shows that there are three local maxima in the density function f (x) for both kinds of orders. Each f (x) function reaches the global maximum value when x = 0, which means that the virtual price π v plays an important role in the process of order placement. A large proportion (3.46%) of the orders are placed on the virtual price to increase the execution probability. The secondary maximum locates at negative x close to x = 0, which means that the traders are more patient: buyers pose higher price while seller put lower price in order to lower their costs with satisfying certainty of execution. The third maximum is close to x = 10%, the daily price limit. In conformity with the trading rule of daily price limit, a large number of patient traders place their orders at the lowest price (for buyers) or the highest price (for sellers) no matter what the current price is. On the other hand, the probability distribution of overnight returns reaches it maximum at zero. The third maximum is thus explained based on these two facts. There is also another significant kink around x = 0.1, which is also induced by the price limit rule.
The distribution of x is asymmetric between the orders placed inside the order book (x < 0) and those outside the book (x > 0). The density f (x) decays more slowly for orders inside the book. Speaking differently, more traders consider to curtail the cost of investment and are less aggressive. In addition, the distribution for buy orders are not the same as that of sell orders. There are more buy orders placed close to the virtual price. The underlying mechanism for this asymmetry between buy and sell orders are not clear.
In Fig. 1(b) , we plot the probability density f (x) as a function of relative price for outside-the-book orders on log-log coordinates. We find that each distribution roughly follows a power law in the bulk
Linear least-squares fitting gives the power-law exponents α buy = 0.13 ± 0.04 for buy orders in the range 0.002 x 0.045 and α sell = −0.31 ± 0.02 for sell orders in the range 0.002 x 0.072.
Distributions in cool period
Following the opening call auction, cool period begins at 9:25 and ends at 9:30. Within this period, the trading system is open to orders routing from members, but does not process orders or cancelation. The trading system presents the information at the first three best on each side. We term it "cool period", because the information including prices and volumes released by the Exchange and displayed on the terminal screens does not change within this time period. Traders place their orders according to those fixed reference information.
The relative price x of a new order is defined as the logarithmic distance from the same best price 2 . In the definition of relative price x presented in Eq. (1), the reference prices are
where π b and π a are respectively the best bid and best ask which keep constant and are independent of time t. The probability density functions f (x) of relative prices x for buy orders and sell orders in the cool period are shown in Fig. 2 . As we can see in Fig. 2(a) , the distributions are similar to their counterparts in the opening call auction qualitatively. However, the probability at x = 0 is higher than that in the opening call auction and the second maximum in the opening call auction disappears. Since there are much less data points in the cool period than in the open call auction, the f (x) functions have large fluctuations in this time period.
In Fig. 2(b) , we present the distributions of the positive relative prices x > 0 on loglog coordinates. The main bodies follow a power-law behavior with the exponent α buy = 1.89 ± 0.08 in the range 0.003
x 0.04 for buy orders and α sell = 1.66 ± 0.09 in the range 0.003 x 0.04 for sell orders.
Distributions in continuous auction
Continuous auction (9:30 a.m. -11:30 a.m. and 13:00 p.m. -15:00 p.m.) is the main part of the trading process. It refers to the process of continuous matching of buy orders and sell orders on a one-by-one basis. The orders not executed during the opening call auction and placed in the cool period automatically enter the continuous auction. The execution price in the continuous auction can be determined according to the following principles: (i) where the highest bid price matches the lowest offer price, the deal is concluded at such price; (ii) where the bid price is higher than the lowest offer price currently available in the central order book, the deal is concluded at the lowest offer price; (iii) where the offer price is lower than the highest bid price currently available in the central order book, the deal is concluded at the highest bid price. The trading system shows the three best prices and their volumes by the interaction of the limit-order book and order flow. Note that there is no closing call auction ( The two reference prices in the definition of relative price x presented in Eq. (1) are chosen as the same best prices:
where π b (t) and π a (t) are the best bid and best ask in the continuous auction which are variable with respect to time t. The probability density functions f (x) of relative prices x for buy orders and sell orders are shown in Fig. 3 . The two distributions for Chinese stocks illustrated in Fig. 3(a) exhibit very different behavior when compared with other stock markets [26, 30, 31, 32, 33] . The most import idiosyncratic feature is that there exist kinks around x = ±0.1, which is induced by the 10% price limit trading rule in the Chinese market. The second discrepancy concerns the asymmetry between buy orders and sell orders. The distributions for both types of orders are identical in the interval x ∈ [0, 0.1], beyond which they deviate significantly. In the interval x ∈ [−0.1, 0], the density f (x) is greater for sell orders than for buy orders indicating that sellers are more patient to place orders inside the book with less aggressive prices. In contrast, there is no significant difference between the distributions for buy orders and sell orders of stocks on the London Stock Exchange [26, 33] . We also find that the distribution for each types of orders in the Chinese market is asymmetric with respect to the same best price (x = 0): there are more orders placed inside the book. This is qualitatively consistent with the result of Maskawa [33] but different from that of Mike and Farmer [26] .
When |x| > 0.1, three tails of the distributions decay exponentially. Compared with Fig. 3(b) , these tails look like power laws. These two descriptions can be unified since ln |x| = |x| − 1 for |x| − 1 being not too greater than 0. For aggressive buy orders with x > 0.1, the tail distribution exhibits an abnormal upward trend. Since there were only limit orders allowed for placement, the best strategy for an trader who wants to have her order executed immediately is to place the order at the highest price allowed π max to buy or the lowest price allowed π min to sell. This consideration partly explain this anomaly. However, it is not clear why the anomaly exists only for buy orders. According to this strategy, one expects to see possible local maxima around x = 0.1 for both buy and sell orders, which is actually the case. For patient traders, the 10% price limit rule provides a simple strategy to place orders at the lowest price π min to buy or the highest price π max to sell. This strategy applies especially to those traders who want to "catch the bottom" or "escape the roof" 3 . This strategy also applied to short-term speculators who think that the intraday price may fluctuate largely 4 .
In Fig. 3(b) , we plot the two sides of each density function on double logarithmic coordinates. Each curve decays as a power law in a certain scaling range. For the positive relative prices, we obtain α + buy = 1.66±0.07 in the range 0.003 x 0.04 for the buy orders and α + sell = 1.80 ± 0.06 in the range 0.003 x 0.04 for the sell orders. These power-law exponents are greater than those of the London Stock Exchange [26, 33] . When we focus on the distributions of negative relative prices, we have α − buy = 1.72 ± 0.03 in the range 0.003 x 0.04 for buy orders and α − sell = 1.15 ± 0.02 in the range 0.003 x 0.05 for sell orders. These exponents are comparable to the results discovered on the London stock Exchange to some extent [26, 30, 33] . However, all these exponents are greater than those discovered on the Paris Bourse and Nasdaq stock market [31, 32] .
Conditional distribution
When placing orders, traders may consider other factors, such as the bid-ask spread, volatility, limit-order depth, and so on. Here, we focus on one of the most liquid stock (Shenzhen Development Bank Co. Ltd, code 000001, see also Table 1 ) in the continuous auction and check whether the probability density function of relative prices is dependent on the bid-ask spread and volatility, respectively.
Conditional distribution on spread
Bid-ask spread, defined as the difference between the best ask price and the best bid price, is considered as the benchmark of the transaction cost and a measure of market liquidity. The definition of bid-ask spread in literature varies and we adopt the definition put forward by Mike and Farmer [26] s(t) = ln π a (t) − ln π b (t) ,
whose statistical properties has been studied for the Chinese stocks [37] . Our test is based on the idea of Mike and Farmer, who found that the distribution of relative prices of orders is independent of the spread [26] . For each order of price π(t) placed at time t, the associated spread is s(t − 1) right before the order placement. The sequence of relative prices is sorted based on the associated spreads. The data set of relative prices is then grouped into four subsets, each of them has identical size. For each group, we calculate the empirical conditional distributions f (x(t)|s(t − 1)) for buy orders and sell orders, which are shown in Fig. 4 . We find that the probability density functions in the four groups for each type of orders are almost the same, independent of the bid-ask spread. The test confirms the empirical results of Mike and Farmer [26] . The result is however contrary to the conclusion proposed by Ranaldo [34] , in which the orders are classified based on aggressiveness and the method is thus a coarse graining of the density function.
It is interesting to note that the f (x) functions corresponding to large spread (the fourth group) have abnormal increase in the positive tail for buy orders in Fig. 4(a) and in the negative tail for sell orders in Fig. 4(b) . These phenomena can be explained partly as follows. When the spread is large, the stock price moves fast. When the price increases, buyers is willing to execute orders immediately so that they place orders at the most aggressive price π max , while the sellers (say, the T + 0 speculators) place orders at the least aggressive price π min .
Conditional distribution on volatility
Volatility is a measure of asset risk in financial markets. We define the volatility as the local average of the absolute returns
where π m (t) = [π a (t) + π b (t)]/2 (9) is the mid-price of the best ask and best bid at time t and N is the number of returns r(t). Here we use N = 50. In order to investigate whether order placement is related to volatility defined in Eq. (8), we divide the whole data into four groups with same size and increasing volatility. The grouping procedure is similar to that used in Sec. 4.1. For each group, we calculate the empirical conditional distributions f (x(t)|v(t − 1)) for both buy and sell orders. The results are illustrated in Fig. 5 . We find that the probability density functions collapse to the same curve for both buy and sell orders, which means that order placement is almost independent of volatility. This conclusion is consistent with the result purposed by Lillo when he studied the limit order price of stock AZN traded on the London Stock Exchange [35] but not in line with the conclusion of Ranaldo [34] .
Conclusion
We have investigated the distributions of relative prices of orders placed in the opening call auction, cool period and continuous double auction using ultra-highfrequency data reconstructed from the quotes database and the trades database of 23 stocks traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange within the whole year 2003. The results for individual stocks are similar to one another, which allows us to aggregate all 23 stocks for analysis.
The distributions in the three time periods exhibit common properties and idiosyncratic features. During the three time periods, the probability density function reaches the maximum at x = 0, which means that a large proportion of orders are placed on the same best price. The distributions are asymmetric between buy orders and sell orders in each period. In addition, each distribution is asymmetric to the same best price x = 0 and there are more orders placed inside the book (x < 0). More interestingly, all the distributions are heavily influenced by the idiosyncratic trading rule of 10% price fluctuation limit, which induces kinks around x = ±0.1. The distributions of large relative prices beyond the kinks decay faster than in the bulks in exponential forms.
We have also studied the dependence of the distributions with respect to the bidask spread and volatility in the period of continuous auction, taking a very liquid stock (000001) as an example. We found that the distributions of relative prices are independent of the bid-ask spread and volatility.
